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SYMPOSIUM: "LESSONS FROM THE SADDAM TRIAL"'
DEBATE: DID SADDAM GET A FAIR TRIAL?
On October 6, 2006, the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center spon-
sored a public symposium reflecting on the proceedings of the Iraqi High
Tribunal. The following transcript is excerpted from the day-long event. The
speakers' remarks have been edited for length.t
MODERATOR:
Gary Simson, Dean, Joseph C. Hostetler-Baker & Hostetler Professor, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law
ARGUING No:
Kevin Jon Heller, Faculty of Law, University of Auckland, New Zealand
Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch
ARGUING YES:
Michael P. Scharf, Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick K. Cox
International Law Center, Case Western Reserve University School of Law
Michael A. Newton, Acting Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Vander-
bilt University Law School
DEAN SIMSON: I thank all of you in the audience for coming and those of
you who will be hearing the debate or are hearing it right now as it
is broadcast.
This conference comes almost a year since Saddam Hussein
and seven of his cohorts went on trial before the Iraqi High Tribu-
nal. They were charged with destroying an Iraqi town and torturing
and murdering its Shiite inhabitants. The proceedings, which were
televised around the world, were anything but orderly, including
events such as assassinations of defense counsel and resignation of
judges. The tribunal will reconvene on October 16[, 2006] for a
judge's review of the process, and at that point, prior to verdict, it is
quite possible some witnesses may be recalled.
The debate that follows will look at the fairness of the trial.
Did it comport with international standards of due process? Two of
* This transcript represents a portion of the from a debate ponsored by the Frederick K.
Cox International Law Center, co-sponsored by the Institute for Global Security Law and
Policy and the Law-Medicine Center.
t A webcast of the symposium, in its entirety, may be viewed online at
http://law.case.edu/centers/cox/content.asp?content-id-=90.
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the people seated here will argue that it was unfair. Professor Kevin
Jon Heller, a member of the law faculty of the University of Auck-
land in New Zealand, will be up first. His life, as well as his teach-
ing and writing, are profoundly international. He has a J.D. from
Stanford, several years of criminal defense practice in Los Angeles,
and then headed off to New Zealand.
Kenneth Roth will speak next. He is the executive director
since 1993 of Human Rights Watch, which, as you know, performs
extraordinarily important functions as far as investigating, reporting
on, and attempting to reduce human rights violations around the
world. He is a graduate of Yale Law School, and Human Rights
Watch has grown enormously in stature and scope under his leader-
ship.
[Among the] two who will argue that the trial was fair is
Professor Michael Scharf, of this law school, who was a member of
the team of experts who trained the judges of the tribunal that tried
Saddam Hussein. With Gregory McNeal, he co-authored the first
book that has appeared on the trial. He is a Duke Law graduate, and
he has been an invaluable member of this faculty since coming here
in 2002.
Michael Newton of the Vanderbilt Law faculty will also
speak. He is a graduate of the University of Virginia Law School.
He practiced law in the military for some time. He served as senior
advisor to the United States Ambassador at Large for War Crimes
Issues.
The debate will go as follows: First, Professor Heller and
Mr. Roth will each get twelve minutes to argue why the trial was
not fair. And then, Professors Scharf and Newton will get twelve
minutes to argue why it was fair. In the same sequence then, each
participant will get two minutes to respond to arguments from the
other side. So let me begin with the first speaker, Professor Heller.
PROF. HELLER: First, thank you to Michael [Scharf] and everyone else for
having me here.
I want to begin my presentation by offering three basic as-
sumptions that frame my approach to this issue. First, there is no
question in my mind that Saddam Hussein is guilty of most, if not
all, of the charges against him. I also believe, however, that Saddam
would have been found guilty after a perfectly fair trial... that you
did not need to cut corners in order to convict him. And third-and
probably most important-the fact that Saddam is guilty of most, if
not all, of the charges against him in no way justifies depriving him
of the [ICC Statute's] legal guarantees required by international
law.
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Now, I want to focus on five critical flaws with the IHT's
procedures, flaws that I believe undermine the fairness of the Dujail
trial and perhaps, given the nature of this get-together, will continue
to undermine the fairness of any trial that is held. So I want to focus
really on the statutory law as opposed to simply the conduct of the
trial itself. And my point is hopefully constructive and not simply
critical. Just as I feel about international criminal law generally, if
there were not so much promise, if there were not so much strength,
there really would not be much point in offering criticisms.
So that said, the first flaw I want to focus on is the burden
of proof. I believe [the IHT] used an inadequate burden of proof.
According to the code of criminal procedure, the tribunal could
convict, "based on the extent to which it is satisfied by the evidence
presented during any stage of the inquiry or the hearing." Now,
there are always difficult translation issues. It has been suggested
that instead of "satisfied," the translation should be "conviction."
But as I will try to explain, even if that is the case, it is still-at
least under international standards-an inadequate burden of proof.
Every tribunal since the NMT, since the Control Council
trials, has used "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." The Human
Rights Committee has continually emphasized proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt is necessary to give effect to the presumption of in-
nocence. And I think it is important-despite the attention the issue
has gotten from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
etc.-to focus on the burden of proof here, because Professor
Scharf has claimed on a number of occasions that, in fact, the stan-
dard that the IHT uses is not inadequate. And I am going to quote
him . . . he says, "The traditional standard with civil law judicial
systems like France and Holland employ a phrase that is function-
ally equivalent to the American 'beyond a reasonable doubt' stan-
dard." With all due respect to Professor Scharf, I do not believe that
is correct. The only civil law system that uses even a remotely simi-
lar standard is, in fact, the Netherlands, which uses a "gain the con-
viction" standard. That standard is arguably more stringent than a
"satisfied" standard, if that is the correct interpretation or transla-
tion. But even that standard has been criticized within the civil law
community as not being stringent enough.
By contrast, France uses an "inner-most conviction" or an
"intimate conviction" standard that the European Court of Human
Rights says is, in fact, equivalent to "beyond a reasonable doubt".
Italy uses a "definitive conviction" standard. Germany uses a
"leaves-no-reasonable-doubt" standard. Spain uses a "reasonable
doubt" standard. Russia uses a "reasonable doubt" standard. Greece
uses a "reasonable doubt" standard. Venezuela uses a "reasonable
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doubt" standard. So really, by any civil law standard, the lIT's
"satisfaction" standard or "convinced" standard is inadequate, and I
think that is a very important point. Professor Scharf continually
dismisses the IHT's flaws by analogizing to the harmless error doc-
trine that we all know is such an integral part of American criminal
law. If we extend that analogy further, in the U.S. an inadequate
burden of proof is never harmless error. It is, per se, a structural er-
ror, requiring reversal of the defendant's conviction, even if the de-
fendant never objects. So this is an extremely critical structural flaw
regarding the burden of proof that the I!HT uses.
The second flaw-and we have heard a lot about it so far-
is the IHT's lack of independence from the Iraqi government. I will
not bore you with the same details that we have heard earlier, but I
just want to root the problem in the text of the statute.
Article 4 of the IHT Statute gives the Iraq Government
complete and unreviewable discretion to decide which judges re-
main and which do not remain on the Tribunal. It says the Presi-
dency Council, in accordance with a proposal from the Council of
Ministers shall have the right to transfer judges and public prosecu-
tors from the court to the higher judicial council for any reason.
And we have seen-as was discussed earlier-the consequences of
that: two judges removed at the Dujail trial, most recently through a
specific invocation of Article 4 to remove the Anfal judge.
Now, nobody wants a biased tribunal, whether that tribunal
is for or against Saddam. But what is critically important to note is
that there are already provisions in the IHT Statute for removing a
biased judge. Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure enacted by the IHT
allows for either party to make a motion to remove a biased judge
and requires the decision to be made on that motion within three
days.
What is the difference between Article 4 and Rule 8? Well,
Rule 8 is an internal process. It is the judiciary itself deciding
whether a judge is biased-whereas Article 4 is the Iraqi govern-
ment-the executive--determining for the judiciary who will be on
the tribunal and who will not. And that is where the fundamental-
and so necessary-independence of the IHT breaks down.
Third-and this one I think can not be emphasized
enough-the tribunal does not confirm an indictment until the mid-
dle of a trial, after the close of the prosecution's case in chief. One
of the provisions of the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure describes
the initial phase of the trial as hearing the testimony of the com-
plaining witness and the prosecution's evidence. And then you have
paragraph 181, which provides, "If it appears to the court after the
aforementioned steps have been taken that the evidence indicates
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that the defendant has committed the offense being considered, then
he is charged as appropriate." The charge is read to him and clari-
fied, and he is asked to enter a plea.
There are three really critical problems with this procedure,
and it is worth noting that the procedure deviates substantially from
all of the other international tribunals. First, it means that the inves-
tigative judge's decision to indict a defendant is never reviewed by
an independent judicial body prior to trial, significantly increasing
the likelihood of an innocent defendant being convicted. The Dujail
trial is a perfect case in point. Prof. Scharf has noted that the prose-
cution asked the tribunal not to convict one of the defendants in his
closing argument. We can certainly hope the tribunal heeds the
prosecution. There is certainly no guarantee that it will, but even if
it does not, how fair is it to subject an innocent defendant to a nine-
month ordeal before ultimately proclaiming his innocence, largely
because there is no procedure in the IHT Statute for pretrial confir-
mation of the indictment, as is standard at the international tribu-
nals?
Second, mid-trial confirmation is fundamentally inconsis-
tent with the defendant's right to be informed "promptly of the
charges against him." Now, there is a provision in the Statute that
requires the tribunal to read the indictment to the defendant prior to
trial, but, of course that indictment is not the final indictment. The
final indictment will be issued mid-trial. The tribunal remains free
to add or change charges against the defendant over the course of
the trial, and the tribunal is under no obligation to inform the defen-
dant that it is going to add charges to the indictment. And, in fact,
that is exactly what happened at the Dujail trial.
The "clarified" May 2006 indictment added new charges
against seven defendants, including compulsory concealment of
people, kidnapping, and the wonderful catchall "other similar ac-
tions against humanity." And this leads, of course, to the final prob-
lem with mid-trial confirmation, which is that it blatantly violates
the defendant's right to have adequate time and facilities to prepare
a defense. You cannot defend yourself against charges that will
change mid-trial-after your appointed counsel or hired counsel has
cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses. That is the third flaw.
The fourth concerns the IHT's provisions for the disclosure
of exculpatory information to the defense. This right is obviously
fundamental to a fair trial. The right of the defendant to receive ex-
culpatory information is the critical mechanism that prevents the
conviction of innocent defendants, and it is particularly important in
a non-adversarial system like Iraq's, where so much of the investi-
gation is conducted by the judge and not by a defense attorney. Rule
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42 of the IHT Statute itself confirms the right of the defendant to
receive exculpatory information. There is, however, a very critical
exception to Rule 42 contained in Rule 43, and the exception really
does swallow the rule whole, to invoke the old expression.
Rule 43 specifically exempts from disclosure all informa-
tion that is provided confidentially to the tribunal, even if it is ex-
culpatory. Here is the rule: "If the tribunal is in possession of in-
formation, which was provided to it on a confidential basis and
which has been used solely for the purpose of generating new evi-
dence, that initial information and its origin, notwithstanding Rule
42"-and that is the exculpatory evidence provision--"shall not be
disclosed by the tribunal without the consent of the person or entity
providing the initial information." Rule 43, in other words, specifi-
cally provides that the tribunal's obligation to protect confidential
information trumps the defendant's right to obtain exculpatory in-
formation. That is a very, very critical limitation and a potentially
vast one, because it clearly embraces-at a minimum-all three of
the categories of information that Rule 40 allows the tribunal to
keep confidential: information relative to an ongoing investigation,
national security information, and the most broad-information
whose disclosure would be "otherwise inimical to the public inter-
est."
Now, did Rule 43 undermine the fundamental fairness of
the Dujail trial? I have absolutely no idea, and that is really the
problem with the rule. We have no idea what information was not
disclosed to the defense. There is no procedure that allows the de-
fense to challenge the nondisclosure of information that is protected
under Rule 43.
I am running out of time. I was going to talk a little bit
about appointed counsel, but since we have seen the skirmishing be-
tween the various parties, I will leave that to them.
I will simply say that if you look at the provision for ap-
pointed counsel, it simply says that the defense office must appoint,
quote, "highly qualified" criminal defense attorneys. They could
certainly appoint adequate ones under that standard, but it is worth
noting that the standard contrasts unfavorably with the ICTY, which
specifically requires experience in international criminal law, inter-
national humanitarian law, or international human rights law. I
think a specific standard like that would lead to far more fundamen-
tal fairness for defendants, given that the IHT is applying interna-
tional criminal law: the definition of crimes, the moods of participa-
tion, the defenses, sentencing considerations, etc. These refer to in-
ternational criminal law. So to not specifically require defense
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counsel to have demonstrated capacity in that body of law funda-
mentally undermines the defendant's right to a fair trial.
And so, just to conclude, there is no doubt in my mind that
Saddam is guilty. There is no doubt in my mind that he would have
been found guilty after a fair trial. His guilt, however, cannot be
used to justify ignoring the countless ways in which the IHT vio-
lated his right to a fair trial.
DEAN SIMSON: Thank you. Next is Mr. Roth.
MR. ROTH: Thank you. Good afternoon, everyone. Let me begin by express-
ing my gratitude to Michael Scharf and to Case [School of Law] for
organizing this very important conference. I also want to say I am
happy to be back here in Cleveland. There was once a time in my
life when I spent three-quarters of my life here, and then when leav-
ing at age four, it left me with very fond memories.
Since then, and particularly since I was at Human Rights
Watch, I spent a huge amount of my time, probably more than any-
one else, looking at the crimes of Saddam Hussein and trying to
bring him to justice. Frankly, it saddens me that we are here having
to talk about the fairness of the trial rather than focusing on his
crimes. I understand the national preference to have national justice,
if possible, but "if possible" is the key. And we should have recog-
nized that in this situation it would not be possible without a much
greater international dimension to the trial than has taken place, and
what we saw instead was ideology over pragmatism, the hatred for
international trials taking precedence over the practicalities needed
to ensure a fair trial that might have let us focus on Saddam's actual
crimes. I say this based on Human Rights Watch's extensive obser-
vations of the trial. We have seen roughly eighty percent of the trial
days during the Dujail trial. We did not watch TV. We did not read
about it in the press. We were there. Most of that time we had a na-
tive Arabic speaker observing, so there was no translation problem
and, most important, we looked at the documents that were actually
submitted, which are, in this case, critical. That observation has
made clear to us serious procedural shortcomings in this trial. And
serious shortcomings were not simply due to the disruption of the
defense counsel, serious as it was. These were due to the way the
trial was conducted.
Much of this frankly comes from the lack of understanding
of what a fair trial is on the part of many of the participants in the
Iraqi court. And that is not surprising given that we have still not
have found a defense attorney or lawyer who remembered a trial
that lasted more than a day-and-a-half before this trial started. In
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fact, as my colleague had mentioned earlier today, the typical trial
to this day lasts fifteen to thirty minutes, and that will often lead to a
twenty or thirty-year imprisonment. So this is not a system with a
well-developed sense of due process.
I want to highlight five serious procedural errors in the
course of the trial. The first to which Kevin [Jon Heller] just re-
ferred has to do with the lack of notice because there was never a
real indictment until well into the trial. The initial indictment basi-
cally said, "you are guilty of crimes against humanity because of
people who were killed around Dujail".. . [no mention of a] theory
of liability. Was this command responsibility? Was it aiding and
abetting? Were you a principal? No detail and basic element of due
process so that you are given the facts so you can prepare your de-
fense.
Half-way through the trial they spelled it out a bit, but that
was after many witnesses had already testified, after the opportunity
to cross-examine them on this theory of liability had been lost. That
is not the kind of notice that is required in order to give people a
fair, fighting chance to defend themselves.
Second, there was extremely late disclosure of much of the
key documentary evidence. The court rules require notice within
forty-five days. That is important so you can read the documents
and figure out what is in them and their significance, so you can au-
thenticate them and challenge them, if appropriate. That did not
happen.
Forty documents were produced in the middle of the trial,
documents that were not in the original dossier so the defense attor-
neys had no access to them before that. In addition, three critical
audio recordings were disclosed-again, right in the middle of the
trial. These were recordings purporting to record conversations be-
tween Saddam and some of his co-defendants about Dujail. The de-
fense objected. The judge let them in nonetheless.
Third, anonymous witnesses. Twenty-six of the twenty-nine
witnesses who testified live during the Dujail trial were what you
might call "constructively anonymous." That is, their names were
deleted from the dossier, so there was no notice of who was going
to testify until they showed up in court, and basically, an hour be-
forehand the name would be disclosed to the defense. Even then, all
but three of the defendants testified behind a screen, so neither the
defendant nor the defense could see their demeanor and use that
important piece of evidence to cross-examine them. This was, of
course, a very severe restriction on their right to confront those tes-
tifying against them. Now, we all know there is a very clear security
danger in Bagdad. Many people have been killed who have been as-
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sociated with this trial, but international practice is to assess that
danger case by case, witness by witness.
That did not happen with the IHT, which instead let the
witness do whatever he wanted or she wanted. If you wanted to be
anonymous, you are anonymous, no measuring the need against the
needs of the trial. And this was the case even with witnesses who
were known. Someone like a former senior official who nonetheless
was allowed to testify out of sight even though everybody knew
who the guy was.
International courts have moved away from this kind of
anonymous witnesses largely because they were burned. One
anonymous witness turned out to be lying through his teeth. Instead,
[international courts] tend to use a confidentiality procedure in
which the defendant and the public may not be informed, but the
defense attorney is. You could not do that here because you could
not trust the defense attorneys because they were only Iraqi defense
attorneys... one more indication of what goes wrong when you do
not allow a certain internationalization.
Fourth, there was no right to confront the twenty-nine other
witness statements that were introduced into the trial. That is, in ad-
dition to the twenty-nine live witnesses, there were twenty-nine
pieces of paper that were read.... No notice was given to the de-
fense as to why this happened. You can not cross-examine a written
statement. When the defense challenged it or asked for the wit-
nesses to be called, they were ignored. There was not even an ex-
plained ruling, just a "no". In fact, as has been mentioned, that was
common. Almost all of the interlocutory challenges, motions, etc.
were simply ignored or denied summarily with no written record or
reason provided to date.
Fifth, when it comes to the authentification of documents
was built around documentary evidence, I know Prof. Scharf said
there was broad authentification of the documents. I am sorry to say
he is wrong here. If you look at what actually happened, only seven
of the documents were authenticated through a Ministry of Interior
handwriting witness. He was brought in and said, "Oh, yes. This is
the signature. These are authentic." It was his written report that
was submitted saying that. He was never cross-examined. No de-
fense handwriting witness was ever allowed. Indeed, the defense
was never given access to the original documents to see whether it
was worth challenging authentification or not, no explanation for
why this extraordinary procedure was used. Those seven documents
were the best cases, the fairest cases. The rest of them, one hundred
or so documents came in with no authentification whatsoever. The
prosecutor would not say where the documents came from. He
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would not allow the defense to inspect the originals. There was no
effort made to create a procedure in which authentification could be
challenged or established. This is, of course, absolutely essential
because who knows where these documents came from. Were they
made up? We just do not know, and we are stuck with a sort of
"trust me" defense.
Worse... if you can get worse ... some of the documents
were, shall we say, incomplete. Let me give you an example. There
was a transcript, shall we say, or a file ... of the revolutionary court
proceedings. This, obviously, is critical because it was a revolution-
ary court that sentenced the 148 or so victims. Instead of introduc-
ing the whole proceedings, they introduced four out of 361 pages.
The judge who presided over this and was one of the accused says
what do you mean? There is exculpatory evidence in the rest of the
file. In fact, that will show they had defense lawyers, a key part as
to whether these were kangaroo trials or not. The rest of the file was
never produced. Harmless error as Michael Scharf has suggested?
Hardly. I mean, how can you call this harmless when the 357 pages
of the 361-page document is never introduced, and the defendant
claims that there is critical exculpatory evidence in there.
The bottom line on all of this: yes, we know Saddam com-
mitted terrible crimes. It is sad today that we are sitting here having
to debate the fairness of the trial rather than focusing on the horren-
dous crimes that Saddam committed. And what makes this particu-
larly sad is that this was avoidable. We could have avoided this by
simply accepting the international expertise that is readily available,
that has emerged out of Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Sierra Leone.
There are people out there who know how to do these trials well.
They could have had a significant Iraqi component similarly to the
Sierra Leone trial, but ideology prevailed. The Bush administration
did not want to do anything that would legitimize the project of in-
ternational justice because it hated the international criminal court,
which, of course, could theoretically prosecute an American. And,
therefore, it was not going to endorse any international tribunal that
might indirectly lend credence to the ICC. It also wanted a court
that it could largely control, that would not ask the difficult ques-
tions, [such as] what was the U.S. relationship with Saddam during
Dujail? What was the U.S. relationship with Saddam during the
Iran-Iraq War? What was the U.S. relationship with Saddam during
Anfal and during its aftermath? Tough questions, and an independ-
ent court might well have allowed those questions to be answered.
So ideology ... prevailed, and what we have now is a seriously de-
fective trial that is diverting us from the terrible atrocities that Sad-
dam has committed.
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Thank you.
DEAN SIMSON: Starting from the other side, Prof. Scharf.
PROF. ScHARF: Thank you, Dean Simson.
One of my professors in law school once told me that where
one sits often colors where one stands. And in this debate, I think
what you are going to find is that worldwide those who are against
the Iraqi High Tribunal and believe that the trial of Saddam Hussein
was a sham are the very same people who, at the very beginning,
were against the Iraqi High Tribunal because it had the death pen-
alty, because it was not an international criminal court, and because
it came after the invasion of Iraq by the United States. I personally
was one of those people when I began, but Michael Newton and I
have had a chance to work with the Iraqi High Tribunal, and I sup-
pose that has [led me] to see things a little bit more sympathetically,
and perhaps the truth is somewhere in between. Let me make six
points today in my twelve minutes.
The first point is that, on paper at least, the Iraqi High Tri-
bunal meets all of the standards of due process required by intema-
tional law. Its statutes and rules are modeled after the Yugoslavia
tribunal, the Rwanda tribunal, and the permanent International
Criminal Court. The protections of due process include: the pre-
sumption of innocence, the right to be informed of charges, the right
to defense counsel, the right to be tried without undue delay, the
right to be present during your trial, the right to examine and con-
front witnesses, the right against self-incrimination, the right not to
have silence taken into account in determining guilt, the right to the
disclosure of exculpatory evidence and witness statements, the ex-
clusion of coerced evidence, and the right to appeal. Note also, Prof.
Heller, Rule 43 ... [uses exactly] the same language as the Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda tribunals' rules on the exclusion of confidential
information that is not used at trial.
Now, my second point is one that will be a surprise to many
of you. In some ways, the [IHT] is actually more fair than the
United States' court system. First, all interrogations must be video-
taped, so there is a videotaped record of whether there was coercion
... something we don't have in the United States. Second, the pro-
ceedings are broadcast gavel-to-gavel, ensuring transparency. The
reason we know about all of these errors and missteps is because we
have gotten to see them on television. In United States federal
criminal courts, there is no television coverage. And third, there is a
written verdict-a detailed verdict that we will see at the end of the
month-that will be three hundred or so pages long, enumerating all
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of the very specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, some-
thing we do not have in the United States. We just have a jury, a
black box that makes a decision.
My third point is that we must assess the Iraqi High Tribu-
nal with an understanding of Iraqi law and process. This is based on
the international law principle known as the margin of appreciation.
We can not look through American eyes in deciding the fairness of
this process. Professor Heller talks about the standard of proof. He
says it is not beyond a reasonable doubt, so the whole thing is a
wreck. Of course, the proof standard is the same language basically
of the Dutch. It is the "satisfied" of guilt. When we talked during
the training sessions with the judges and explained what that means
in practice, they used another phrase. They said, "We like to convict
only when there is proof beyond a moral certainty." This is actually
a phrase that most of the civil law countries use. I talked to them
more about what that phrase means, and I came away convinced
that it is either the functional equivalent or even a tougher standard
to meet than our "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
Also Professor Heller failed to tell you that our own Su-
preme Court has never defined what "beyond a reasonable doubt"
means, leaving it for every jury to try to guess at this phrase, as if it
in itself has some special quality .... [This is more than] what the
Iraqi High Tribunal requires.
Professor Heller complained about the mid-trial confirma-
tion of the indictment. Well, this is actually very similar to what the
Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals do when half-way through the
trial they entertain motions to dismiss, and literally, what the tribu-
nal does at the beginning of the trial is decide whether there is
enough evidence to begin. And after the prosecution's case, then
they decide whether there is enough evidence to continue. They do
give the charges at the beginning of the trial. They give even more
specific charges based on the evidence half-way through the trial.
This is the way they do it in the Middle East. Are all the Middle
Eastern countries flawed, simply by virtue of the fact that they are
different?
Third... the role of the defendant. In Iraq law, the defen-
dant gets to ask questions. It is very different than what we see in
the United States, but it actually increases the level of fairness to al-
low Saddam to have this opportunity.
Fourth... pretrial motions. We heard Mark Ellis earlier to-
day complain that the pretrial motions were not decided pretrial,
and I wish they had been as well. That is the way they do it in the
international tribunals. That is not the way they do it in some courts
around the world. These pretrial motions will all be addressed in the
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three hundred-page opinion, and that is, in fact, the way they did it
at Nuremberg. That is, in fact, the way they do it in many countries.
And there is nothing under international law that says that is, per se,
a violation.
My fourth main issue is that there are unique challenges
that the Iraqi High Tribunal faces. We have heard today about the
antics of Saddam Hussein. Let me give you some specifics. Every-
day Saddam goes into the courtroom with the goal of interrupting
this trial by enticing and inducing the judge of yelling at him so the
trial will look unfair. He has called the judge a homosexual, a trai-
tor, a whoremonger. He has insulted his family. He has called him a
dog-which in Iraq is the worst thing you can call somebody-and
every once in a while, the judges have lost their temper. Now, in tri-
als in the United States like the Zacharias Moussawi trial last sum-
mer, when the defendant did the same thing, Moussawi was thrown
out of the courtroom by the U.S. federal judge four times in a single
day. When that happens in the United States, the professors and the
commentators say that was appropriate. Why should it not be ap-
propriate when the same thing happens before the Iraqi High Tribu-
nal?
We can even look back at the Bobby Seals incident during
the Chicago Seven trial to see what happens when a defendant tries
everything possible to disrupt a trial, and Bobby Seals, as we all
know, ended up being gagged and bound. It was not a good moment
for American jurisprudence, but sometimes American judges are
struggling with the same kinds of problems, and there are not a lot
of options.
My fifth point is about harmless error. We heard some pre-
emptive discussion by both my colleagues about that. The docu-
ments in the trial-and there were seven that were authenticated-
these seven are actually posted for you to read on our website [the
Grotian Moment blog] so you can decide for yourself. They are in
Arabic with English summaries. They actually prove all of the main
elements of the crimes against Saddam Hussein. The surprise here
was that this was like Nuremberg. Saddam, if he is convicted, will
be convicted on the strength of his own documents. The documents
show Saddam Hussein ordered the destruction of the town of Du-
jail. He ordered the rounding up of the three hundred people. He or-
dered their interrogation. He gave medals of honor to the interroga-
tors who ended up killing one-third of these people during interro-
gation. He ordered them then tried by the revolutionary court, and
he signed their death certificates ... all 148 people tried. That is the
record. Those are documents.
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You know what? Saddam Hussein admitted on March 1
that those documents were true. In his famous statement to which
my colleague and co-author, Greg McNeal, refers as the Jack
Nicholson moment from A Few Good Men, Saddam Hussein said,
"Yes, I admit it. I gave those orders, but any president in my situa-
tion would have done the same thing."
And so this case is really a legal case. It is about one ques-
tion of law. Is it appropriate for a leader to do what Saddam did?
The facts are not in dispute. Ultimately, that question of law will be
decided first by the trial court. And if that court is, for some reason,
biased because of the yelling matches that have gone on, that same
legal issue will be decided by the nine appeals judges who will not
have been biased.
Also and finally, I want to point out that we have seen a lot
of misleading press reports about this trial and I myself have fallen
prey to this. Two weeks ago I got a call from both the Washington
Post and the Los Angeles Times. They asked, "Did you hear what
the President of Iraq just did?" I said, "No, tell me." They said,
"The President just reached down and had the judge removed."
Many of the [panelists] today have pointed that out as the biggest
problem with this tribunal. And then what did I do? I shamelessly
gave a quote .... The Washington Post [reported], "'This raises
alarm bells,' said Michael Scharf at Case Western Reserve Univer-
sity School of Law, an advisor to the tribunal.... It looks like the
government is trying to meddle with the tribunal. This will erode
the tribunal's independence and legitimacy further in the eyes of the
international community and the Iraq people." And [it was worse
in] the L.A. Times, I suppose ... it said, "Professor Michael Scharf,
a law professor and war crimes tribunal expert at Case Western Re-
serve University in Cleveland said that Allawi's dismissal could set
a dangerous precedent for executive branch meddling in the judici-
ary." Well it was not until the next day that I found out what hap-
pened, and this is often the case with the poor Iraqi High Tribunal
and the misleading press reports. This is what happened: the prose-
cutor had requested the removal of the chief judge; the other judges
got together and voted unanimously to have him removed; they then
had the president of the tribunal make a request to the president of
the Iraq government to have him removed... not because what the
press reported. He said, "Saddam, you are no dictator" but, rather,
because there was a record of one hundred or more things that were
being mismanaged at the trial in the first three weeks .... they just
felt that they needed better management. If I had known that was
[what had really happened], I would not have said those things to
the press. I would have said this is the way it should be working.
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So let me conclude like this . . . the Iraqi High Tribunal
must be fair, but we also must be fair in assessing it. The trial was a
mess, that is for sure, but the errors and missteps did not create a
miscarriage of justice.
Thank you.
DEAN SIMSON: And last is Professor Newton.
PROF. NEWTON: Thank you very much.
The intellectual caliber both of these debates and of this
group has been impressive, and it is an honor to be here. The fa-
mous English poet Ian Hamilton once said that "On the day of bat-
tle, the truth lies naked on the battlefield. The next morning she has
gotten up and put on her uniform." And I think that is what is going
on a lot. The defense strategy of disruption and distortion has really
distracted from a timely focus on what is really going on in the
courtroom, particularly in light of the Arabic nature of the proceed-
ings. And I must say with great respect to both Human Rights
Watch and some of the other trial observers, there is much more-
and I know this firsthand-that goes on behind the scenes to ensure
a fair trial and a fair process than what you ever actually see in the
courtroom. And I think that is important because Article 20 of the
Iraqi constitution says that the right of defense is sacred in all stages
of investigation and trial in accordance with law. This lofty and
quite correct sentiment has been reiterated from the bench on sev-
eral occasions in response to misconduct by the defendants or their
lawyers. That is what a fair trial is. It is a trial based on the evidence
and based on counterargument, based on the law, and based on the
presentation of evidence in the courtroom. And that is what you
have seen in that courtroom in Iraq.
You have seen it in a way that-in fact, contrary to popular
perception-has resisted political pressure. People all over Iraq for
months have asked, "Why isn't this trial done? Why isn't it moving
faster?" In fact, in early 2004 after an investigative judge had the
first investigative hearing with Saddam, there was lots of political
pressure. Iraqi leaders attempted to leverage the tribunal for their
own gain by publicly promising that "the trials are going to begin in
the fall." They did not because the trial judges were not ready. The
evidence was not ready. Commentators pressured the tribunal to act
and in the winter of 2004, you heard that trials were beginning in
the spring. The tribunal judges resisted political pressure at every
step along the way, and, in fact, today there has been no demon-
strated record of political pressure from outside the process actually
affecting what happens in the courtroom. There has been enormous
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conjecture and speculation about the effects of political pressure
and posturing on the trial processes, but there is no record from
within the courtroom to support such assertions.
I must point out just in passing that the effort to discredit
the process is not a new standard. We have seen that for Milosevic
called the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via a "lawless act of political expediency." Let me give you a quote:
"Here you have the U.S. pressing for a criminal tribunal against its
enemies so, in effect, the statute authorizes this process, which is
war by another means. You are attacking your enemies by first de-
molishing them, by telling the word that they are genocidal murder-
ers." I know that this sounds like a defense press conference in
Amman during the Dujail. In fact, this is Ramsey Clark in the ICTR
context. My point is that attempts to portray criminal prosecution as
a biased and unfair process are not a new tactic. The Dujail trial has
seen a deliberate defense campaign to try to discredit what has gone
on in the courtroom simply by creating the illusion that it is merely
an extension of politics. In fact, it has been the other way around.
The judges have striven with great, great fortitude to try to keep the
politics out of the courtroom over and over and over again. They
have said, "This is not a political trial .... If you have an eviden-
tiary point to make, please make it. . . . If you have a piece of ex-
culpatory evidence that you want to be obtained, please request it..
.. Keep the politics out.... Let us stick to the facts.... Let us stick
to the law." And, in fact, most times when you see Saddam on CNN
rampaging, they will cut it, and what they will not show is what
comes next when the judge says, "I am the judge. You are the de-
fendant. I am the judge applying Iraq law in accordance with the
rules of procedure . . . if you have a substantive point to make,
please make it." That is what a fair trial is all about, folks. It is
about evidence, and it is about law.
Now, we all know that, as was pointed out, one of the criti-
cal, fundamental, basic trial rights is the right to have adequate time
and facilities for the preparation of the defense. That point has been
made today repeatedly. It has been made by our opponents. Despite
claims to the contrary, defense counsel have been able to see their
clients every single time they request, sometimes not when they re-
quested. There has been a delay because of transportation and secu-
rity issues. Sometimes they have been transported in a way that they
did not like, but they have been able to see their clients. They have
also been able to exchange documents. During trial-I do not think
this has ever been said publicly and it is true because I saw it-
during trial, they have a secure video link where they can get on the
phone and talk in a secure way with their clients. So there is plenty
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of opportunity to both prepare and conduct a vigorous and affective
defense based on reason.
The point was made about sixty-day processing. Yes, the
Iraqi rules and the statute require forty-five days before trial... the
referral packet. That was met. In this trial, the defense got the refer-
ral file sixty days before trial, thereby exceeding the required stan-
dard. The evidence that is discovered during trial is, of course,
handed over promptly just like any other court in the world to in-
clude the ad hoc tribunals. One more point about the preparation of
the defense. They came to court the first day on October 19. They
told the judges, "We did not have adequate time to prepare," despite
the fact that they had more time than required by the statute. What
did the judges do? The defense was awarded a thirty-day delay right
off the bat. That happened on three subsequent occasions, so that
today... out of a twelve-month trial, over three-and-a-half months
are attributable to defense requests for more time for preparation.
That is the hallmark of a fair trial, a bench that is bending over
backwards to give the defense the adequate time and opportunity.
One more point about exculpatory evidence .... People [al-
lege that] the entire Dujail file was not turned over. Remember that
over 140 civilians were executed based on orders signed by Saddam
Hussein supposedly implementing the trial sentences handed down
by his co-defendant, Anad Bandar. Of those, the evidence is clear
that many died during torture at the hands of Iraqi security forces
under the control of another co-defendant, and a number were mi-
nors who could not have stood trial. The fact is that the very exis-
tence of a trial record for those victims is one of the critical ques-
tions of fact at trial. There is very powerful evidence that there was,
in fact, no trial ever held. There is some small evidence on the other
side that there was a trial. There was a request made by the defense
for the records of trial that would prove it existed. Such records are
not available, so, of course, they were not [submitted]. All of the
documents related to the Dujail trials were handed over ... the ones
that were in the possession of the court.
I want to make one more point about the conduct of the de-
fense because I think this is critical. The phrase "daughter of a
whore" was referred to, among many insulting things that would
have gotten people disbarred from any other court in the world. One
day on July 29, Saddam stood up and said, "Down with America.
Down with a traitor, long live Iraq." Every single defense lawyer
stood up and chanted with him. Now, as prosecutor, I would have
been horrified, and any judge that I know would have been horrified
and kicked him out of court and quite possibly sanctioned the attor-
neys for contempt of court. That did not happen in this trial.
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The judges have bent over backwards to give the defense
time, after time, after time to both prepare for trial and participate in
a good faith manner, which, in fact, goes to the allegations of bias.
In my mind, if there has been any bias here, it has been on the part
of the judges biased toward a fair process, letting them get away
with things they would never get away with in an ordinary civil
court or any court in the world at a domestic level. In fact, the
bench did have the power to hold them in contempt. The judges
could have relied on the authority of a very pointed rule both from
the substantive rules of procedure, but also from underlying Iraqi
Criminal Code: "A judge or a criminal court may impose legal pro-
ceedings against counsel if in its opinion the counsel's conduct be-
comes offensive or abusive or demeans the dignity and the decorum
of the special tribunal or obstructs the proceedings." Rule of Proce-
dure 31(First). See also Rule 52(First): "The Trial Chamber may
exclude any person from the proceedings in order to protect the
right of the accused to a fair and public trial, or to maintain the dig-
nity or decorum of the proceedings."
I would submit to you that every single one of those prohi-
bitions has happened on the part of the defense multiple times, and
it has never been met with a sanction of contempt precisely because
the judges are bending over backwards to let them present a fair
trial, to let them engage on the evidence if they choose to do so. The
fact that they have not chosen to do so is not an indictment of the
tribunal; it is the indictment of the defense counsel.
Two points to end with ... one, there has been a lot of talk
about the security environment. There have been widespread claims
that the security environment itself affected a fair trial. I would say
to you, that is a question of fact for the tribunal. That is a question
of legal argument to be made during closing arguments. If, in fact,
there was a legitimate effect of the security environment on the
conduct of the defense, that is precisely the kind of point you
[should] document in a written brief.., that you put into your clos-
ing argument. What did the defense do? They boycotted the closing
argument. They said, "We are afraid to go to Baghdad." The truth
is-and this is a matter of historical record-they were in Baghdad
two times the same week to consult with their clients, but on the
day appointed to go to court, make the closing arguments, docu-
ment for the historical record the gaps in the defense, the way they
think they have been mistreated, the legal effect on the case, which
is a critical legal piece here, they refused to do it. And they have
their own reasons for doing that. I am just saying the fact is that
there has been no demonstrable effect of the security environment
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on the actual conduct of the case. Witnesses were procured. The
evidence was procured.
With respect to the deaths of the defense counsel, that is en-
tirely tragic. In my mind, those people died as heroes in defense of
the rule of law. However, let me point out-and this is factually
true-the first two deaths came the first day after the opening of
trial. The court was already in a thirty-eight-day recess at defense
request to prepare for time. Tragedy. But I would not say that hav-
ing additional time after those deaths to prepare would critically
undermine the rest of the trial. Yes, the [defense team may have
suffered some consequences] ... And the record demonstrates that
when they asked for more time, the court granted them more time.
The same thing also happened with Khamis Ubaidi. The
court was already in recess for an extended period of time when he
was murdered, allowing defense to prepare its closing arguments.
And, in fact, we know objectively that his death had no real effect
on the presentation of the evidence because the defense also chose
to boycott closing arguments. The fact is, in every single way pos-
sible, this court has provided secure transportation to the defense at-
torneys [in extraordinarily complicated circumstances]. They have
bent over backwards to preserve the right to present evidence, to al-
low the defense to collect evidence, to gain them access to their cli-
ents when appropriate. They provided secure housing for the de-
fense attorneys during the conduct of the trial days. They had done
everything they could do despite the security environment to ensure
that these trials go on, and at a fundamental level, the court, I be-
lieve, made a fundamental decision that said the point of this proc-
ess is to demonstrate a fair trial, fair process in accordance with in-
ternational standards. If we simply stop the trial because of the se-
curity environment, because of the threats, what we are essentially
doing is rewarding those who are waging war against the rule of
law. This court made a very courageous stand to uphold the rule of
law, to try to conduct a fair trial in extraordinary circumstances.
I will end by quoting the appeals chamber of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. "It is in the in-
terests of justice to include the interest of the international commu-
nity in a fair and expeditious trial and the effective presentation of
evidence." And that is what you have seen in that courtroom. You
have seen no procedural bars to that. You have seen no systematic
bars to that. You have seen no political bars from that. As was said
earlier, this was not a sham trial; this is a substantive trial. It is a
trial based on evidence. It is a trial based on law. It is a trial based
on fact and fundamental fairness, and that is the historical record for
which I believe this trial should be remembered.
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DEAN SIMSON: We are up now to the rebuttal.. . each will get two minutes
to respond to arguments from the other side. We will start with
Prof. Heller.
PROF. HELLER: Thank you. Two minutes is not enough to respond point by
point, so I will just make a few general comments. First, I am cer-
tainly not against the IHT. I certainly do not believe that the trial
was a sham. Quite the contrary. What I do believe in, however, is
the importance of written law-as opposed to informal procedure.
Fifty years from now.. . one hundred years from now, there will be
no judges of the Iraqi High Tribunal to talk to. Even the youthful
Michael Scharf will not be here to explain how the trial actually
functioned. All you look back on after the passage of time is the
written law. That is what governs this trial. That is what governs fu-
ture trials. Maybe Article 4, which gives unreviewable discretion to
the executive to remove a judge, was not used without the participa-
tion of the tribunal in this particular situation. I do not know. I can
not comment on that. I do know, however, that the provision is
there. It undermines the already existing provisions that allow the
tribunal to police itself. One of the great things about Iraqi law is its
commitment to strict legality. There is a provision in the constitu-
tion preventing the retroactive application of criminal legislation,
and I think the more that we simply ignore that limitation, the
weaker the court becomes.
And the final point is-and Professor Bassiouni has talked
about it before-that I am not an uncritical believer in international-
izing everything. I believe countries have the sovereign right to cre-
ate their own legal systems. I would not have complained if, in fact,
it had been a more Iraqi process. I still might disagree with certain
points, but I have no problem with the general idea. But, what I do
find problematic with the IHT is that it is somewhere in between. It
wants to incorporate international criminal law in terms of new
kinds of crimes, new kinds of liability, different kinds of sentencing
considerations, but it does not want to incorporate international
criminal law when it comes to the protection of the defendant [and]
the procedural guarantees. And that kind of selective incorporation
of international criminal law is what I find the most troublesome
about the IHT.
DEAN SIMSON: Thank you. Next, Mr. Roth.
MR. ROTH: What is striking to me is how much the defenders of the tribunal
ignore the reality of the trial. Nothing about the vague indictment
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that gave no notice and opportunity to prepare, nothing about the
unnecessary use of twenty-six anonymous witnesses who could not
be effectively cross-examined, nothing about the twenty-nine wit-
nesses who had a written statement turned in, which you could not
possibly cross-examine. Instead we get a bunch of straw men. Mil-
osevic discredited the [ICTY], so I guess I am like Milosevic? The
Iraq war... people are against that. What does it have to do with
anything here?
We want to follow the good rules of the court, but they
were not followed. So let us look at it through Iraq's eyes ... the
same eyes that have a fifteen-minute trial for a thirty-year sentence.
I do not want to look at it through those eyes. I want a fair trial.
The disruptions of the defense attorneys were destructive,
but none of the problems I outlined had anything to do with that dis-
ruption. They were all the way the judges chose to conduct the trial.
Now, where we did try to meet on some of these facts? Michael
[Scharf] says seven of the documents were authenticated. Look on
his website. The reality there was a handwriting expert whose writ-
ten statement was submitted. He could not be cross-examined. The
defense was not allowed to submit its own handwriting expert to
give a contrary point of view, and the defense was not allowed to
even look at the original document. They could look at the website,
but you cannot tell from a website whether something is authentic
or not. That is not a fair way to proceed.
Another example, Michael Newton says ... well, we don't
even know if there was a trial in the revolutionary court, but we do
know that there was a 361-page file, which was cherry-picked, so
that the four bad pages were put in, but the 357 allegedly good
pages were kept out. I used to be a federal prosecutor. If I did that, I
would be disbarred, if not prosecuted. Here we are calling it harm-
less error.
This is not the trial we want. These were awful crimes. We
should be focusing on the crimes, not on this parody of justice that
took place, and we did not have to be here. Any objective assess-
ment of this would have said we need a Sierra Leone-type situation
where it is internationalized, as much national preservation as pos-
sible. Instead ideology prevailed, and we went with a national sys-
tem that was not ready for it.
DEAN SIMSON: Thank you. Professor Scharf?
PROF. ScHARF: Thank you.
This week marks the sixtieth anniversary of the Nuremberg
tribunal's judgment and on the faculty of law at Case Western Re-
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serve University, we have a former prosecutor from Nuremberg,
eighty-seven year-old Henry King, who was twenty-five during the
Nuremberg trial. Prof. King has told me repeatedly-and I have
seen the documents myself-about how in the aftermath of Nurem-
berg the Supreme Court judges who were the colleagues of Chief
Prosecutor Robert Jackson said things publicly, like "the Nurem-
berg trial was nothing but a high-grade lynching party"... "that the
Nuremberg trial violated so many provisions of fair process that no
fair trial in the world, no civilized system would accept its find-
ings." Well, now sixty years later, we celebrate Nuremberg, and I
am going to make a prediction ... I predict that sixty years from
now-and maybe in only ten or twenty years-people will look
back at the Iraqi High Tribunal and also its sister court, the Bosnia
trial, which is very-they are domestic tribunals that have interna-
tional elements. There are crimes; there are rules, and the advisors
are international. If you look back at these tribunals with all of their
flaws, as launching a new kind of criminal tribunal, that is an im-
portant supplement to the International Criminal Court and to do-
mestic trials.
Thank you.
DEAN SIMSON: Thanks. And last, Professor Newton.
PROF. NEWTON: The legal phrase is an "equality of arms," and by sheer
happenstance, the trial days ended up split exactly down the middle
for both the defense and prosecution in terms of witnesses. This is
potentially important because it shows the latitude given to the de-
fense to present their case and to present their exculpatory evidence.
In all, there were twenty-two confirmation government and prose-
cution witnesses in contrast to sixty-two defense witnesses.
The numbers really don't matter. What matters is the fact
that the defense had every chance in the world to present its case,
even to the point-and I think this is critically important to remem-
ber-after it became obvious that the defendants themselves were
going to take every opportunity to disrupt the proceedings, they
were still allowed to present exculpatory evidence, to present their
opinions, to cross-examine witnesses-a remarkable demonstration
of good faith in an effort to present an open and fair trial.
I will tell you in closing one of the most inspiring things I
have seen in my life as a lawyer was during the day that the ap-
pointed defense counsel came to deliver closing arguments. This
was only necessary because the retained counsel boycotted their
own closing arguments despite the clear warnings of the judges that
the trial would not be held hostage. Saddam stood up, and he
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wagged his finger, and he said, "If you speak, you are an enemy of
the state." And these arguments had, in fact, been prepared by the
international advisor, which was pointed out, but then critically they
were taken by the Iraqis and changed. They were Iraqi arguments
by Iraqi lawyers. Saddam stood up, and he wagged his finger and he
said, "if you speak, you are an enemy of the state" on live televi-
sion. That lawyer stood up and spoke for four hours, and his argu-
ments were very substantive, and very powerful. He spent time at-
tacking the evidentiary basis, attacking the forms of participation,
attacking all the substantive things that we teach in our law school
courses. That is what a fair trial is all about. That is what you have
seen in Baghdad, but not what has been portrayed through the me-
dia filter.

